The effects of terrorist activities on foreign direct investment: nonlinear Evidence by Omay, Tolga et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effects of terrorist activities on
foreign direct investment: nonlinear
Evidence
Tolga Omay and Bahar Takay Araz and Deniz Ilalan
Cankaya University Economics Department, Baskent University
Economics Department, Cankaya University Economics Department
9. April 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31015/
MPRA Paper No. 31015, posted 20. May 2011 19:25 UTC
 1 
 
The Effects of Terrorist Activities on Foreign Direct Investment: Nonlinear Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Tolga Omay
1
 
 
Bahar Araz Takay
2
 
 
Deniz Ilalan
3
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine the relationship between foreign direct investment and terrorist 
incidents that took place in Turkey for the period from 1991:12 to 2003:12. This research 
contributes to the literature by checking for a possible non-linear relationship between 
terrorism and foreign direct investment. The data used to measure the intensity of terrorism 
were collected from the newspapers of Turkey, and therefore are limited to the direct 
signals given to the market. Empirical evidence from both linear and non-linear models 
confirms that terrorism has a large significant negative impact on foreign direct 
investment. With respect to the nonlinear model, the impact of terrorism on the foreign 
direct investment is more severe during periods of high terrorism when the intensity of 
terrorism passes the threshold level 3.725.  
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 2 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, we investigate the economic costs of terrorist activities on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Thus, we explore whether terrorist incidents can deter foreign direct 
inflows through an atmosphere of threats and heightened financial risks. The paper has 
three primary purposes. The first one is to understand whether the relationship between 
terror and FDI is significant for Turkey or not. The second one is to investigate whether the 
relationship between these variables is linear or nonlinear. Finally, we aim to obtain a 
specific threshold level if the relationship between FDI and terrorist activities is nonlinear. 
Nonlinearity has important implications with respect to the economic and political costs. 
The policy makers can learn and revise their policies with respect to the relationship 
between the aforementioned variables, if they know a specific threshold value. To 
understand the political and economic costs of terror, it is important to determine whether 
terrorist campaigns force sufficient political and economic costs on a government so that it 
concedes to the political demands of the terrorists. Terrorist-imposed economic costs may 
stem from at least four sources; losses from tourism revenues, losses from foreign direct 
investment, destruction of infrastructure, and finally resources used to deter terrorist 
attacks (Enders and Sandler, 1996). If the expected costs combined with a terrorist 
movement do not exceed the expected costs associated with making awareness, then the 
government should maintain its position. Otherwise, the government should negotiate or 
else allocate sufficient resources to nullify the threat. At this point, it is important to know 
the threshold level which is a by-product of the nonlinear models. This threshold level 
gives very significant information to policy makers where the terrorist activities have lower 
effects on FDI below the threshold level and more vice versa. Therefore, the information 
provided by a nonlinear model can influence the policy maker’s decision notably. If the 
intensity of terrorism is below the threshold level, then terror can be taken as a noncredible 
threat and the government will hold its position or vice versa. On the other hand, the 
threshold obtained from the nonlinear regression model has also important signals for  
foreign investors.  The relatively less-informed foreign investors can use this threshold 
level in making their investment decisions
4
.     
 
One should also be careful in drawing conclusions regarding mutual causality between FDI 
and economic variables. Some studies have also examined the other causal direction; i.e. 
from economic activity to terrorism (Abedie, 2006; Santos Bravo and Mendes Dias, 2006), 
or both causal directions (Enders and Sandler, 1991, Araz et al. 2010). Eckstein and 
Tsiddon (2004) used a VAR analysis of Israeli data to show that terror has significant and 
detrimental short-term effects on major macroeconomic variables such as consumption, 
investment and net exports. It has also been argued that terrorism has longer-term effects 
on the economy. Blomberg et al. (2004) used a set of unbalanced panel data to show that 
terrorism has a negative effect on long-term economic growth. Abadie (2006) showed that 
countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to 
terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom, or countries with highly 
authoritarian regimes. His results suggest that transitions from an authoritarian regime to a 
democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism. Santos Bravo and 
Mendes Dias (2006) showed that the number of terrorist incidents is negatively associated 
with the level of development, the literacy level and ethnic fractionalization, being 
positively related to mineral reserves, non-democratic political regimes and participation in 
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international organizations. Similarly, Rübbelke (2005) used a game theoretical framework 
to analyze terrorist activities, and submitted several options in his study to combat 
terrorism. He found that mitigating the income of social groups susceptible to terrorism in 
response to terrorist attacks reduces the level of terrorism, whereas it may also increase the 
terrorists’ willingness to commit suicide attacks. Enders and Sandler (2005) used a 
threshold autoregression (TAR) model to show that the autoregressive nature of casualties 
from terror depends on the level of terrorism at the time of a shock. In their study, the TAR 
model outperforms a standard autoregressive representation. Araz et al. (2009) used a 
Nonlinear ST-VAR analysis of Turkey data to show that terror has significant and 
detrimental short-term effects on long-term economic growth. They have tested linear 
VAR versus nonlinear ST-VAR model and concluded that the nonlinear ST-VAR model is 
superior to linear one.  Hence, one might argue that the terrorism variable can be better 
investigated by using non-linear models. Moreover, other studies show that non-linear 
models outperform linear models with respect to economic activity. For instance, Potter 
(1995) and Pesaran and Potter (1997) applied threshold autoregressive (TAR) models to 
find evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks over the business cycle. Similarly, 
Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) and Teräsvirta (1994) tested linearity against smooth 
transition autoregressive (STAR) models and provided support for autoregressive 
representation. 
  
This study contributes to the literature in three different ways. First, a novel data set is used 
for Turkey which signals the market directly. Consistent with Abedie (2006), Turkey has 
experienced a considerable increase in the level of domestic conflict during its trade 
liberalization process, which started in the early 1980s. The existence of continuous 
terrorist activities up to today provides excellent position for investigating the effects of 
terrorism on FDI. Second, by incorporating the results of studies such as Araz et al. (2010), 
Enders, and Sandler (1992, 2005) into the analysis, it is hypothesized that the relationship 
between terrorism and economic activity is nonlinear. By using this nonlinear model, we 
estimate threshold level of terrorist activities which affects FDI more accurately. The 
estimated threshold level has two important implications, one for policy makers and the 
other for foreign direct investors. Therefore, we analyze this issue extensively. Finally, we 
provide a simple economic model of nonlinear relationship between FDI and terrorist 
activities.   
 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief history 
of terrorist activities and FDI for Turkey. Section 3 discusses the underlying economic 
model. In section 4, we discuss specification and estimation of STR models and give the 
results of the linearity tests against STR-type nonlinearity. The estimates of linear and STR 
models are provided in section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion.  
 
 
2. Brief History of Terrorism and FDI for Turkey 
 
 Turkey’s history of terrorism can be classified in two periods:  period before September 
12, 1980 and afterwards. The terrorist activities occurred before 1980 can be defined as the 
actions that are fundamentally ideological. Clash of different ideological groups in the 
country, initially started as a conflict between right-wing and left-wing students, but later 
spread in waves, covering the whole country turned into terrorist attacks. The aim of the 
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terrorist activities of the aforementioned period was to replace the existing constitutional 
order.  
 
The second period constitutes the subject of our study. This period beginning from August 
14, 1984, includes the terrorist activities that differ significantly from 1980 pre-term 
actions. Seggregation of these two periods is based on the area covered by the terrorist 
activities, definition of terrorism and the purpose of terrorism. PKK-separatist terrorist 
organization initiated acts of terrorism in East and Southeast Anatolia in 1984, and the 
actions continue for many years. These terrorist incidents resulted in deaths of tens of 
thousands, and the incidents continue. When compared to the other regions of Turkey, East 
and Southeast Anatolia regions have three distinct features:  the people of these regions 
have a different ethnic structure; the regions are composed of people that are mainly of 
Kurdish origin; and these two regions have a lower level of economic development. These 
three features are among the main reasons of PKK terrorism in these regions. Moreover, 
Araz et al. (2009) showed that the number of terrorist incidents is negatively associated 
with the level of economic growth for Turkey with the similar data. Thus, increasing 
income levels of these regions lead to a substantial decline in terrorist activities.  
 
There is an unequal income distribution in Turkey especially with respect to these two 
regions. The presence of these differences is a well-known fact that causes separatist 
movements. In western regions of Turkey, per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) value 
is well above national average, while this value of eastern regions of Turkey is below the 
national average. From Table 1 and Table 2 we can observe these facts clearly. 
 
Table 1. GDP  Shares of the regions   
Marmara E. Anatolia Mediterranean S. Anatolia Aegean Black Sea C.Anatolia 
37% 3.3% 11.9% 5.2% 17.1% 9.3% 15.7% 
 Constant price 1996 
 
Table 2. Number of Households and available income distribution by the Regions 
Regions 
 Turkey Marmara East 
Anatolia 
Mediterranean South E. 
Anatolia 
Aegean Black 
Sea 
Central 
Anatolia 
Households 100.0 26.6 15.7 12.5 17.9 12.8 7.1 7.4 
Available 
annual 
income 
 
100.0 
 
38.6 
 
13.9 
 
11.0 
 
15.4 
 
10.9 
 
5.7 
 
4.5 
 Constant price 1996 
 
After the financial liberalization during the 1980, there existed an increase in FDI for 
Turkey. This process continued until 1992 when the political instability took place because 
of coalition governments. During the 90’s, these coalition governments ruled the Turkish 
political environment and caused inefficiencies in the economic performance of Turkey. 
Especially the bad economic performance prevented foreign investors from investing in 
Turkey which means that the FDI values have decreased after 1992.  In 1992 the permits 
which were given to FDI decreased 7.5 percent with respect to the previous year and the 
value of the FDI were 1.967 billion dollars and 1.820 billion dollars, respectively. In 
Figure 1 below we can trace the yearly volume of FDI from 1954 to1993 when the 
empirical sample period started.    
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Figure 1. Yearly FDI between 1954 and 1993 
 
 
On the other hand, the percent of FDI inflows has to be analyzed with respect to country 
groups. From Table 3 we can see some summary figures of FDI for Turkey with respect to 
these countries. Table 3 compares 1996 and 2000 figures of FDI which cover the mid 
sample period of empirical analysis. We see that Turkey attracts FDI from west Europe 
extensively. 
 
    Table 3. FDI figures of Turkey comparing year 1996 and 2000 
 Num of firms Value Percent% Total Capital 
Countries   1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 
Holland 173 345 14.870 282.686 14.8 21.91 22.778 469.433 
France 192 255 13.650 163.803 13.6 12.70 23.241 296.881 
Germany 620 932 13.044 160.811 13.0 12.46 27.480 256.817 
US 245 325 12.645 158.696 12.6 12.30 19.044 282.175 
Resources: *1996 FDI, DPT, 1997 year program, pp. 154.  
                   *2000. Treasury; http.//www.treasury.gov.tr/stat/yabser/ulketurk.htm 
* Figures are given in Billion TL 
 
 
Table 4. Sectoral Distribution of FDI Companies 
 Num of firms Value Percent% Total Capital 
Sectors   1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 
Agriculture 84 125 771 11162 0.8 0.87 1,982 23,139 
Mining 47 74 713 10536 0.7 0.82 1,335 20,056 
Manufacture 876 1312 51,163 592,452 51.0 45.95 105,604 1,170,638 
Service 2456 3717 47,637 675,249 47.5 52.37 81,446 1,231,986 
Total 3463 5228 100,285 1,289,399 100.0 100.0 190,367 2,445,821 
Resources: *1996 FDI, DPT, 1997 year program, pp. 155.  
                   *2000. Treasury; http.//www.treasury.gov.tr/stat/yabser/ulketurk.htm 
* Figures are given in Billion TL 
 
In 1993 FDI tends to increase when the value of FDI reaches to 2.124 billion dollars. 
Unfortunately, in 1994 Turkish economy experienced a heavy economic crisis which 
decreased the FDI level to 1.484 billion dollars, this sharp drop from 1993 to 1994 is 
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nearly 30% percent. This sharp fall was followed by a recovery in FDI figures and every 
aspect of economic indicators as well after 1994.  In 1995 FDI faced with a peak value in 
percentage change in the history of the Turkish economy which is  97.91%. Therefore, this 
increase lead to 2.938 billion dollars FDI value for this year. For 1996 there was a 30.5 % 
percent increase with respect to the previous year which lead to 3.836 billion dollars FDI 
value. The Turkish economy had affected from 2 more economic crises until 2003, one of 
which was  Russian crisis and the other one was 2001 crisis. From the figures of FDI, we 
have seen that these crises had detrimental effects on FDI.  
 
  
3. Theoretical Model 
 
We have used Ragnar-Frisch type of model in order to explain the non-linear relationship 
between FDI and terrorist activities. The model implicitly assumes that terrorist activities 
have impacts on FDI but there is no causality relationship from FDI to terrorist activities. 
Therefore, there is uni-directional causality in theoretical modeling. In the model we have 
foreign investors and nature which is determined by terrorist activities. We view foreign 
direct investors as rational actors who maximize their well-being by allocating their 
resources intertemporally. At time 0, we consider a foreign investor who tries to allocate 
his wealth between riskless domestic bonds and FDI index contingent upon the states of 
the world at time t. There are two possible future states of the world with probabilities q 
and 1-q respectively where q[0,1]. When state 1 occurs, there is a terrorist activity which 
derives the value of the market portfolio (the index) down significantly, hence making FDI 
less profitable than riskless domestic government securities. When state 2 occurs, the 
terrorist activity has no significant impact on index rendering the returns from FDI higher 
than riskless bonds. 
Let 1tC consumption of the investor at time t in state 1, 2tC  consumption of the 
investor at time t in state 2, 1te  wealth of consumer when state 1 occurs,  2te  wealth of 
consumer when state 2 occurs. Assuming that there is no consumption at t=0, let the 
representative investor have the following utility function: 
 
 U ( 1tC , 2tC ) = q ln( 1tC ) + (1-q) ln( 2tC )          (3.1) 
Now the representative investor solves  
                                        
1 2,
Max
t tC C
  q ln( 1tC ) + (1-q) ln( 2tC )                                (3.2) 
subject to                                 1tC + 2tC = 1te + 2te                                                     (3.3) 
  
Direct substitution yields:         
1
Max
tC
 q ln( 1tC ) + (1-q) ln ( 1te + 2te - 1tC ) 
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First order condition gives:                 1 1 2 1
1 2
1
1
0
( )
2 1
t t t t
t t
t
q q
C e e C
q e e
C
q

 
 

 

                                   (3.4) 
and from the budget constraint we have 
                                                      1 22
( 1)( )
2 1
t t
t
q e e
C
q
 


                                       (3.5) 
hence the investor’s optimal utility becomes  
                              U = q ln 1 2
( )
2 1
t tq e e
q


+(1-q) ln 1 2
( 1)( )
2 1
t tq e e
q
 

                       (3.6) 
For the case 1te + 2te =1 showing us that up to a certain q between 0 and 1 the utility is 
increasing and begins to decrease beyond that q which is the probability of a terrorist 
attack, rendering FDI unprofitable for the investor. For the values other than 0, 1 closed 
interval there is no significance. We always encounter similar behaviors for other values, 
demonstrating us that there is indeed a transition point altering the decision of the foreign 
investor which we can define this point as threshold level. Equation (3.6) shows us a 
behavioral equation of representative foreign direct investor hence this leads to a functional 
relationship between FDI and terror as follows: 
        1 2 1 2
1 2( , , , , , ), 1,...,
st st st st
t state state t t t i t iFDI f Terror Terror X X FDI FDI i p               (3.7)    
This general form of FDI equation is specific to one country which has faced these types of 
representative FD investors or agents. 1 2,state stateTerror Terror  are representing the nature of 
the economy hence there occurs two types of distinct regimes in the economy, 1sttX  and 
2st
tX  represent  the other factors which are affecting the volume of FDI including crises 
dummies, 1stt iFDI   and 
2st
t iFDI   represent the lagged values of FDI in two regimes, 
respectively. All the other variables are again depending upon states except crisis 
dummies. From this general functional form, we can affirm that instead of linear modeling 
a nonlinear modeling is more suitable. Therefore, we have to prefer one of the nonlinear 
modeling in the literature like Markov Switching, TAR or STR in order to estimate 
equation (3.7). These models have their own advantages over each other. In our case, 
Markov switching model seems to be more suitable because we explicitly define states and 
their probabilities. However, Markov switching models have some obstacles for our 
situation. First, Markov switching models impose an abrupt switch in parameter values 
where we are not expecting this kind of dynamic in between the FDI and terror 
relationship. Second, Markov switching models estimation procedure does not provide any 
kind of threshold level which we want to estimate a threshold level as an indicator for 
policy purposes. Finally, Markov switching model has a hidden process where the STR 
model allows for different types of market behaviour depending on the nature of the 
transition function.  
Because of these arguments we consider smooth-transition autoregressive models 
(originally proposed by Chan and Tong, 1987 as a generalization of the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model, and developed further by Teräsvirta and Anderson, 1992, 
Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993, Teräsvirta, 1994) which are capable of capturing the 
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nonlinear behaviour arising from the state of the market (i.e. differing dynamics depending 
on whether the market is rising or falling
5
). The smooth-transition model is selected for a 
number of reasons. First, it is theoretically more appealing over the simple threshold and 
Markov switching models which impose an abrupt switch in parameter values. Such 
instantaneous changes in regimes are possible only if all agents act simultaneously and in 
the same direction. For the market of many traders acting at slightly different times, 
however, a smooth transition model is more appropriate. From Section 2, we have seen 
that there are different foreign direct investors, which lead to a heterogeneous structure of 
FD investors. On the other hand the terrorist activities are ex-post phenomenon which 
occurs after some FDI agreement has taken  place. Therefore, most of the investors do not 
have any initiative to invalidate the current agreements which they have signed (ex-ante) 
before any terrorist activity. However, some of them do. If these terrorist activities 
continue, there will be a gradual decline in FDI. Hence, this type of behaviour causes a 
smooth transition from one regime to other, on the contrary of abrupt regime shifts as well.  
Second, the STR model allows for different types of market behaviour depending on the 
nature of the transition function. Finally, STR model allows explicit estimation of 
threshold value for an indication of policy issues. 
 
4. Specification and Estimation of STR Models 
 
A STR model for a time series ty is given by  
    ttttt ucsFxxy  ,;'20,2'10,1            (4.1) 
 
where tx  is a vector consisting of lagged values of the endogenous variable and other 
endogenous variables. The disturbance tu  is white noise with zero, and is assumed to be 
homoscedastic over regimes with variance 2  and to be normally distributed. The 
transition function  csF t ,;  is a continuous function bounded between 1 and 0. Thus the 
STR model can be interpreted as a regime-switching model that allows for two regimes, 
associated with the extreme values of the transition function,   0,; csF t   
and   1,; csF t  , whereas the transition from one regime to the other is gradual. The 
parameter   determines the smoothness of the transition, and thus, the smoothness of 
transition from one regime to the other. The two regimes are associated with small and 
large values of the transition variable ts  relative to the threshold c .  
Two popular choices of the transition function  csF t ,;  are the logistic function  
 
 
 
tst
t
cs
csF


/)(exp1
1
,;

            (4.2) 
 
And the exponential function 
 
                                                 
5
 In our case if there is a threat of terrorist activity or not. 
 9 
   22 /)(exp1,;
tstt
cscsF              (4.3) 
 
where 
ts
 is sample standard deviation of the transition variable ts .  
 
These yield, respectively, the logistic STR (LSTR) and exponential STR (ESTR) 
models. The logistic function is convenient for modeling different dynamics depending on 
whether the terrorist activity take large or small value, i.e., the direction of disequilibrium. 
Thus, the LSTR model can describe a situation where low terrorist activity and high 
terrorist activity periods have rather different dynamics. In contrast, the transition occurs 
symmetrically for ts  about threshold c  if exponential function is used in (4.1). The ESTR 
model implies that low terrorist activity and high terrorist activity periods have similar 
dynamics (see Teräsvirta and Anderson, 1992). 
The empirical specification procedure for STR models consists of following steps (van 
Dijk, 1999:18): 
 
1. Specify an appropriate linear autoregressive model for the time series under 
investigation.  
2. Test the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of STR-type 
nonlinearity. If linearity is rejected, select the appropriate transition variable ts  and 
the form of the transition function  csF t ,; .  
3. Estimate the parameters in the selected STR model. 
4. Evaluate the model using diagnostic tests.  
5. Modify the model if necessary.  
6. Use the model for descriptive or forecasting purposes. 
 
Since the nonlinearity tests are sensitive to autocorrelation, the lag structure of the 
autoregressive model should be specified so as to capture the significant autocorrelation in 
the linear model. Applying conventional information criteria such as Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) can be selected the lag structure of 
the model.   
Once the appropriate linear model is defined, we carry out linearity tests against the 
alternative STAR-type nonlinearity. The linearity tests are complicated by the presence of 
unidentified nuisance under the null hypothesis. This can be seen by noting that the null 
hypothesis of linearity may be expressed in different ways. Besides equality of the 
parameters in the two regimes, 210 :  H , the alternative null hypothesis 0:
'
0 H  also 
gives rise to linear model. To overcome this problem, one may replace the transition 
function  csF t ,;  with appropriate Taylor approximation following the suggestion of 
Luukkonen et al (1988). For example, a first-order Taylor approximation results in the 
following auxiliary regression 
 
tttttt esxsxy 
'
10,1
'
00,0              (4.4) 
 
Where '1
'
00,0 ,,   are functions of the parameters  ,, 21 and c, and te  comprises 
the original shocks tu  as well as the error term arising from the Taylor approximation. In 
(2.4) it is assumed that the transition variable ts  is not one of the elements in tx . If this is 
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not the case, the term ts0,1  should be dropped from the auxiliary regression. The null 
hypothesis of linearity can be expressed as 0: 1
'
1
''
0 H , that is, the parameters associated 
with the auxiliary regressors are zero. This null hypothesis can be tested by a standard 
variable addition test in a straightforward manner. The test statistic, to be denoted as LM1, 
has an asymptotic 2  distribution with degrees of freedom p+1, where p is the dimension 
of the vector tx .  
As noted by Luukkonen et al (1988), the LM1 test statistic has no power in situations 
where only the intercept is different across regimes. Luukkonen et al (1988) offer a remedy 
for this deficiency by replacing the transition function  csF t ,;  by a third order Taylor 
approximation instead. This would result in the following auxiliary model  
 
tttttttttttt esxssxssxsxy 
3'
3
3
0,3
2'
2
2
0,2
'
10,1
'
00,0                       (4.5) 
 
The null hypothesis now corresponds to 0: '''0 iH  , 3,2,1i , which again can be tested 
by a standard LM-type test. Under the null hypothesis of linearity, the test statistic, to be 
denoted as LM3, has an asymptotic 2  distribution with degrees of freedom 3(p+1). Since 
only the parameters corresponding to 2ts  and 
3
ts  are functions of  0,1  and 0,2 , a 
parsimonious or economy version of the LM3 statistic can be obtained by augmenting the 
auxiliary model (4.4) with regressors 2ts  and 
3
ts  , that is 
 
ttttttt esssxxy 
3
0,3
2
0,2
'
1
'
00,0            (4.6) 
 
The resultant statistic is the LM3
E
 statistic.  
To identify the appropriate transition variable ts , the LM statistics can be computed for 
several candidates, and the one for which the p-value of the test statistic is smallest can be 
selected. 
When the appropriate transition variable ts  has been selected, the next step in 
specification of a STR model is to choose between logistic and exponential functions. 
Terasvirta (1994) suggests using a decision rule based on a sequence of tests in equation 
(4.5). Particularly, he proposes to test the following null hypotheses 
 
i) 0 :H 303   
ii) 00 :H 3202    
iii) 00 :H 23101    
 
in (4.5) by means of LM type tests. These hypotheses are tested by ordinary F tests, to be 
denoted as F3, F2, and F1, respectively. The decision rule is as follows: If the p-value 
corresponding to F2 is the smallest, then ESTAR model should be selected, while in all 
other cases LSTR model should be preferred.  
Once the transition variable and form of the transition function are selected, the STR 
models can be estimated by using any conventional nonlinear optimization procedure. The 
burden on the optimization algorithm can be alleviated by using good starting values. For 
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fixed values of the parameters in the transition function,   and c , the STR model is linear 
in parameters 0,1 , 
'
1 , 0,2  and 
'
2 , and therefore, can be estimated by OLS. Hence, a 
convenient way to obtain sensible starting values for the nonlinear optimization algorithm 
is to perform a two-dimensional grid search over   and c , and select those parameter 
estimates that minimize variance of the residual term.  
After estimation, we perform diagnostic tests to evaluate the estimated STR model.  
Particularly, we perform misspecification tests for skewness and kurtosis, as well as the 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test of Engle (1982), and the LM 
tests for autocorrelation, parameter constancy, and additive nonlinearity, as suggested by 
Eitrheim and Terasvirta (1996). If the estimated model passes all misspecification tests, 
then it can be used for descriptive purposes. 
 
 
5. Data and Empirical Results 
 
In this paper, we consider monthly terror index and FDI for Turkey, covering the period 
from 1991:12 to 2003:12. The FDI data are taken from electronic data distribution system 
of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. On the other hand, the terror index composed 
by collecting data from newspaper. For this purpose, the data series for the terror index is 
obtained from the archives of the leading Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet. Official statistics 
of the government have not been used to identify the publicly announced events, which 
have an effect on the behavior of economic agents
6
.  
 
Following Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), the terror index used in this paper is 
defined as the natural log of (1+ number of human casualties + the number of people 
injured + the number of terrorist attacks) for each month, for the period from 1991:12 to 
2003:12. Nevertheless, the empirical results are robust to the use of an alternative terror 
index, which incorporates the log of the number of casualties. The terror index and FDI 
figures are presented in Figure 2. 
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Fig 2. The Relationship between Terror and FDI 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 1 We assume that only publicly announced events in the media might have an effect on economic agents. 
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All the asymptotic theory for the STR models is for stationary regressors up to 
deterministic time trend which has also been studied explicitly. Therefore, the specification 
procedures described in the previous section rely on the assumption that the FDI and 
terrorist activity index are (0)I  process. In order to analyze this fact, we first test whether 
the data have unit root by using unit root test up to deterministic time trend, prior to 
estimation of the linear model. It is well known that conventional unit-root test have low 
power if the true data generating process is non-linear. Hence, in addition to conventional 
unit root test ADF, we also applied the non-linear unit root test KSS.  
 
Table 5.1. Unit Root Tests 
Variables                    ADF                   KSS 
 Intercept Intercept and Trend Intercept Intercept and Trend 
 Terror  -4.345* -5.345* -6.713* -5.082* 
 FDI -3.193** -3.675** -7.765* -7.709* 
*, ** indicates significance levels of 1% and 5% respectively 
 
The test results examined within the sample derived from the KSS test reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root at 1 % significance level in the examined series, whereas ADF test 
reject the null hypothesis at 5% for FDI series when trend included. From the linear and 
nonlinear unit root test, we can conclude that all of the variables in the study are I(0). Thus, 
we can continue with the linear model estimation. We have first tested the direction of 
causality and found uni-directional causality from terrorist activities to FDI consistent with 
our theoretical model. The linear model is initially specified with maximum lag order of 
12, with intermediate lags then deleted one by one (starting with the least statistically 
significant according to the t-ratio) provided that such deletions reduce the AIC. The 
estimated linear model for FDI is as follows: 
 
 
The values below the parameter estimates are p-values. Durbin Watson (DW) statistic for 
no autocorrelation,. ARCH is Engle’s (1982) test against conditional heteroscedasticity. 
The estimated model does not reveal any misspecification
7
. The ARCH test suggests no 
nonlinearity in the conditional variance. Therefore, we proceed to linearity tests to check 
for nonlinearities for the model under consideration.  
The results of the linearity tests are reported in Table 5.2. As the table reveals, the null 
of linearity is rejected at conventional significance levels for a number of candidate 
transition variables. However, the p-values of all LM-type statistics are the smallest for 
6tTer   was considered as a transition variable. Therefore, we focus on this variable 
hereafter.  
  
 
                                                 
7
 We have included crisis dummies for 1994, 1997, and 2001, but we have found that they are not significant. 
Hence, we did not hold these crisis dummies in model.  
1 1
p r
t t t t
i i
dys dys ter 
 
      
 
(3.145) ( 5.204) ( -1.689)
4 1
 [9.060] [0.077] [2.384]
28.498 0.403 4.028t t tdys dys ter     (5.1) 
R
2
=0.349
  
DW= 1.944  F-test= 16.266(0.000)  ARCH(1)= 0.046(0.829)  ARCH(4) =3.478 (0.481) 
ARCH(8)= 7.163 (0.519) 
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Table 5.2.Linearity Test  
Lag/State variables       
t
ter  
t
fdi  t  
1 12.519(0.000) 3.204(0.005)  
 
 
 
 
2.092(0.0585) 
2 0.491(0. 813) 12.339(0.000) 
3 11.220(0.000) 2.351(0.034) 
4 6.404(0.000) 1.480(0.189) 
5 6.516(0.000) 3.326(0.004) 
6 12.705(0.000) 2.539(0.023) 
7 8.054(0.000) 2.108(0.056) 
8 9.699(0.000) 1.214(0.302) 
9 6.965(0.000) 3.448(0.003) 
10 8.741(0.000) 0.815(0.560) 
11 3.512(0.003) 2.085(0.059) 
12 4.540(0.000) 5.687(0.000) 
 
Having selected the most appropriate transition variable we conduct a sequence of F tests 
described above to determine the form of the transition function. The F statistics and 
corresponding p-values are reported in Table 5.3. Since the p-value of the F3 statistic is the 
smallest, we select the logistic function and estimate LSTR model as our theoretical model 
suggest in section 3. 
 
Table 5.3. Selection of transition function between LSTAR and ESTAR 
  
03 3: 0H    26.622(0.000) 
02 2 3: 0 / 0H     7.773(0.000) 
01 1 2 3: 0 / 0H       0.124(0.000) 
 
For obtaining initial values to facilitate the nonlinear optimization algorithm we have 
conducted an extensive two-dimensional grid search over   and c , ranging   (after 
scaling) from 1 to 100 by 0.01 increments and ranging c  from 1.990 to 6.507 by 0.01 
increments
8
. Before proceeding to estimation of the LSTAR model using the optimal 
values of the parameters   and c  obtained from the grid search, we have deleted 
intermediate lags one by one (starting with the least statistically significant according to 
the t-ratio), if such deletions had reduced the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), and 
conducted a new grid search.  
We have estimated the model using nonlinear least squares, which is equivalent to 
quasi-maximum likelihood based on a normal distribution. Under certain (weak) regularity 
conditions, which are discussed by White and Domowitz (1984) and Pötscher and Prucha 
(1997), among others, the NLS estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal. The 
estimated LSTAR model is given in equation (5.2) with transition function in (5.3) below. 
The exponent in the transition function is divided by the variance of the transition variable 
in order to make   scale-free. 
 
                                                 
8
 We have based our range for threshold value c on observed range of terror index by discarding the extreme 
values at each end.  
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(3.355) ( 2.058) ( -1.863) ( -1.619) ( -1.940)
4 1 4 1
 [8.187] [0.444] [1.776] [0.276] [1.375]
27.470 0.915 3.310 ( ; , ). 0.447 2.667t t t t t tdys dys ter G s c dys ter   
 
      
  
 
(5.2) 
 
(1.122) (13.792)
1
1
[3.564] [0.270]
; , (1 exp{ 4.001( 3.725)})t tF s c ter

     (5.3) 
 
The values below the parameter estimates are p-values. In addition, we have tested the 
estimated LSTAR model against additive nonlinearity, parameter constancy and remaining 
nonlinearity as proposed by Eitrheim and Terasvirta (1996). The results of these tests 
appear in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4. Diognastic Check for Nonlinear estimation 
 Remaining Autocorrelation Parameter 
Constancy 
Remaining Nonlinearity 
Transition variable 
l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6  
 
0.332 
(0.99) 
 
d = 1 d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 d = 5 d = 6 
0.68 
(0.40) 
1.59 
(0.20) 
1.22 
(0.30) 
0.95 
(0.43) 
1.14 
(0.34) 
0.95 
(0.46) 
1.33 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.99) 
0.99 
(0.50) 
0.76 
(0.78) 
0.62 
(0.91) 
1.09 
(0.38) 
l = 7 l = 8 l = 9 l = 10 l = 11 l = 12 d = 7 d = 8 d = 9 d = 10 d = 11 d = 12 
0.84 
(0.55) 
0.72 
(0.66) 
0.64 
(0.75) 
0.57 
(0.83) 
0.93 
(0.51) 
1.59 
(0.20) 
0.69 
(0.85) 
0.88 
(0.63) 
0.85 
(0.67) 
0.70 
(0.83) 
0.56 
(0.94) 
0.52 
(0,96) 
 
Diagnostic tests are presented in Table 5.4. As it can be seen from the table, diagnostic 
tests do not show any problems for two-regime STR models. The LM test statistic provides 
no support for multiple regime STR model which suggests that the fitted model contains no 
additional nonlinearity. The LM test for parameter constancy and remaining 
autocorrelation test have the same kind of conclusion. Hence, overall, the estimated LSTR 
model is quite satisfactory. Consequently, the predicted STR models can be used to 
describe the relationship between FDI and terrorist activity. 
  
The estimated value of the slope coefficient   is equal to 4.001. This suggests that the 
speed of transition between the two regimes is moderate in line with stylized facts, 
contrary to the Markov and TAR models, which assume an abrupt change in regimes.  
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                                                 Figure 3. Transition Function  
 
 
The estimated values of the location (threshold) parameter c, the transition parameter 
gamma and the graph of the estimated transition function as a function of 
6tter  , provide 
useful information about the features of the transition itself and the interpretation of the 
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model. Figure 3 shows the transition function. It can be seen that there is a moderate 
change from one regime to another. This is also indicated by the relatively low value of the 
estimated transition parameter gamma = 4.001. The estimated threshold value of c = 3.725 
points to the halfway point of the transition. This means that when 
6tter  = c, then 
 ; ,tF s c = 1/2. It indicates the half-way point between the low regime terrorist activity 
and high regime terrorist activity for Turkey. There are many observations lying on both 
sides of this parameter, clearly implying the existence of two distinct regimes. These 
regimes can be defined with respect to the values of the past values of 
tter  relative to the 
estimated threshold value c = 3.725. That is, when 
6 < 3.725 tter   ; , 0tF s c  , associated 
with declines in FDI, then there is low state of terrorist activity. When 
6 > 3.725 tter  , 
 ; , 1tF s c  , this is associated with more severe decrease in FDI; in other words, high 
state of terrorist activity. Moreover, different parameter estimates can be seen for different 
regimes. Therefore, the LSTR model implies asymmetric responses of terror to FDI. 
 
Equation 5.2 and 5.3 provides the LSTR estimation of the monthly data with one lag. The 
values in the parentheses are t values. Based on the estimate results obtained, it is 
understood that a non-linear type investigation of the relationship would be better. The 
result of the LSTR estimate shows that, the regime which has low terror activity has a 
coefficient value of -3.310 and it is statistically significant at 5% level of significance. The 
high level of terrorism state’s coefficient value is -5.977 with a 10% significance level. The 
results show that the lag of the terror index has a significant negative impact on FDI in 
both of the regimes. This result is consistent with the previous results from the linear 
model. Moreover, the nonlinear estimation reveals that the detrimental effects of terror on 
FDI are larger in magnitude during high-level terrorist activity periods than during low 
level terrorist activity periods. This result is quite intuitive, and implies that the fear-of- 
heavy financial loss during high-level terrorist activity regime and therefore causes more 
distortions compared to low-level terrorist activity regime.  
 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The results provide evidence of a non-linear relationship between terrorism and foreign 
direct investment. Clearly, these results have important policy implications. The outcome 
shows that the causation from terrorist activity towards FDI holds during low and high 
level terrorist activity periods. This implies that an increase in terrorist activity always 
means a decrease in FDI. On the other hand, policymakers should be more careful during 
high level terrorist activity periods, as terror shocks seem to have a larger impact on FDI. 
We have mentioned that if the expected costs combined with terrorist movement do not 
exceed the expected costs associated with making recognitions, then the government 
should hold its position. Therefore, below the threshold level 6 < 3.725 tter  , policy makers 
have low incentive to stop terrorist activities because of the low cost. If the terrorist 
activities increase and pass the threshold level 6  > 3.725 tter  , the government should 
negotiate or else allocate sufficient resources to nullify the threat. Therefore, the threshold 
level is a good indication for policy makers to interact with the events. Thus, the 
information provided by the nonlinear model can influence the policy makers decision 
notably.  On the other hand, the threshold obtained from nonlinear regression model has 
also important signals for foreign investors.  The foreign investor who is less informed can 
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use this threshold level as an indicator that the country is risky or not. Therefore, they 
organize their investment decision with respect to this indicator. If terrorist activities 
increase and pass the threshold level 6  > 3.725 tter  , the foreign director investor should 
decrease or stop FDI to Turkey. From these arguments, we can conclude that it is 
important to estimate threshold levels of terrorist activities for all countries which face 
terrorist events. Hence, for further study by using nonlinear time series analysis or 
nonlinear panel data analysis, this group of countries should be investigated in order to find 
a useful indicator for policy makers and foreign direct investors.      
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